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Friday 30 August 2013

Parliamentary sovereignty and foreign policy

It’s less than twelve hours since the shock defeat of the government not over involvement in a punitive attack on Syria but on the principle of such an attack.  It is to the Prime Minister’s credit that he immediately accepted the verdict of the House of Commons as well as making clear that he will not use his powers under the Royal Prerogative to thwart that verdict, something that is within his powers to do.  In fact, on this particular issue the Prime Minister was on a hiding to nothing whichever way the vote had gone.  Had he won the vote, this morning people would be saying that Britain was again acting as the United States’ lap-dog and that there would inevitably be mission creep leading to more direct involvement in Syria.  Now that he has lost the vote, Britain is being accused by some of appeasing dictators, that our standing in the world community has been diminished and that this is a bad day for democracy.  Given that even the most naive commentator could have predicted these outcomes, one has to ask why the Prime Minister went down a road that was going to lead to disappointment whatever the outcome.  In reality, the government was unable to convince MPs and by extension the country that we should be involved in yet another Middle East adventure. 

Within the British Constitution, the executive makes and implements policies while the legislature hold those policies to account.  It is not a case of who is in charge. Neither is it the case that MPs set Britain’s foreign policy; they simply rejected a policy that the government proposed as is their constitutional duty.  Foreign policy is this morning still set by the executive but it must, as has been the case since the votes on the Iraq war in 2003, carry Parliament with it instead of relying on the antiquated notion of the Royal Prerogative.  Foreign policy, especially in relation to peace and war, is now a collegial matter.  The government lost because it was unable to convince MPs of either the intelligence or legal case for intervention and this raises important questions not simply about the legitimacy of intervention but raises important questions about political timing:

  • Given that intelligence concluded that there had been 14 previous chemical attacks in Syria, was it simply the scale of the attack last week that led to a change in policy from one of diplomatic warnings but largely inaction to intervention?  In other words, the global community (effectively the alliance of the willing in the West) could not longer be seen to do nothing. 
  • Given that this is the case, why then did the West seek to intervene before the UN weapons inspectors has completed their examination of the incident and before the matter had been discussed in the UN Security Council?  In other words, why did it not follow due process?  In Britain, this became a critical issue when Ed Milliband decided, probably strongly influenced by the poisonous legacy of Iraq, that he could not support the government’s policy until due process had been observed.  Whether this was a principled stance or political opportunism, the Prime Minister should at this point have postponed any debate until after the weapons inspectors reported (probably early next week) rather than proceed with a vote on the principle of intervention.
  • That he did not reflected what most commentators believed: Parliament would vote for the principle of intervention and that this would have made it more difficult for it later to vote down any motion calling for that principle to be put into practice.  MPs would need to demonstrate why, having voted for the principle of intervention, why it should not be applied in the case of Syria.  At one level this was a tactically sound approach from the government as there seemed little likelihood that it would lose.  In fact, had all the Labour MPs been present, it is likely that it would have lost by a greater margin that thirteen votes.  Had the Prime Minister decided to postpone the debate until next week it is quite possible, even probable, that he would have won.  Timing it seems is everything.

Wednesday 28 August 2013

Evidence, International Law and Intervention

There appears to be a new ‘standard of proof’ among western politicians based round the principle of asserting something is the case and then later finding the evidence that sustains the case.  Yet, the only thing about the chemical attack a week ago that is clear is that an attack occurred and large numbers of people died.  What is not is who was responsible.  The balance of probability points to the Assad regime—it has the necessary resources and means of delivery and the attack took place in an area controlled by rebel forces—but in matters where the West is inclined to intervene I think that we need to apply the principle of ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ not the lesser burden of proof.  Given that the policy of the Western allies towards Syria over the past year has been one of procrastination, allowing weapons inspectors time to collect the necessary evidence and establishing who was responsible for the attack before intervening would be a better solution than the current gung-ho approach.  There have been chemical attacks before (though not on this scale) and there have been atrocities on both sides, ‘red lines’ have been crossed in the past but, apart from strong words, the West has continued its attempts to find a political and diplomatic solution.  Western intervention may well make a bad situation worse.  Intervention in Iraq, though no one is talking about boots on the ground in Syria, makes that point  and if Tony Blair, the Middle East ‘peace envoy’ is in favour of intervention then I think that we should be very careful.

So, without definitive proof that the Assad regime perpetrated the atrocity, would military intervention be legal?  In the absence of an international court that can give a definitive ruling on the legality or otherwise of intervention, the West appears to be relying on the developing notion of ‘responsibility to protect’ that emerged out of the humanitarian disasters in Kosovo and Rwanda in the 1990s.  The idea is widely though not universally accepted and has three parts:

  • States must protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, while, simultaneously, the international community has an obligation to help states prevent such crimes.
  • Where there is strong evidence of these crimes and a state cannot or will not stop them, the international community should exhaust all peaceful means in seeking to bring the atrocity to an end.
  • If all that is done, and fails, the international community can use military force.  The force deployed would be limited and specifically targeted at stopping further atrocities.

If all these criteria are met, then the use of military force would, some lawyers argue, be legal in international law.  To have real legitimacy, military intervention should be authorised by the United Nations Security Council, the primary arbiter in the use of force in international law. Given Russia’s and China’s support for the Assad regime, this is an unlikely scenario. The critical question is whether the second of these elements has been met: have all peaceful means been exhausted?  Given that Syria’s divisions can only be resolved by a peaceful political solution, this is doubtful and in that respect the legal case for intervention is far from conclusive.  Whether the ‘responsibility to protect’ covers a punitive strike to punish the regime for using chemical weapons is also doubtful.

The Middle East has long been a tinder-box and the history of western intervention is hardly one of unmitigated success.  Take, for instance, the initial success of military intervention in Iraq followed by the failure to have a longer-term plan for dealing with the aftermath of regime change.  The West’s solution appears to be that introducing democracy will resolve the problem.  Wrong.  What the introduction of democratic institutions in countries without a democratic tradition does it to exacerbate divisions that had previously been held in check by strong dictatorial leadership—the tyranny of the majority replaces the tyranny of the individual.  We seem to forget that western democracy did not emerge as a refined system but was deeply contested over many decades and yet we appear to think that it will immediately put down deep roots in societies where strong leadership has been the norm. 

Statements that intervention will demonstrate ‘the West’s resolve not to allow the use of chemical weapons’ or ‘intervention is a test for Europe’ neglect the law of unintended consequences. 

  • If missile strikes (the most likely option for intervention) occur and further atrocities take place, what options are then open to the West?  Further strikes?  Physical intervention?  If so, who among the fragmented Syrian opposition is the intervention in favour of?  One of the problems with military intervention is that if it fails to achieve its objectives (and it is far from clear what the objectives in Syria are other than protecting civilians), what happens next?
  • Intervention will inevitably lead to increased tension between the ‘alliance of the willing’ and Russia and China.  It will make finding an agreed solution more not less likely.
  • Israel will be made more vulnerable to attack from Syria (something already stated) and bring it into a conflict that it has largely stood outside.  If Israel then attacked Syria, what would Iran’s response be?   Active intervention by Israel could unite Arab nations.

There is little appetite among public opinion in the West for further military ‘adventures’ in the Middle East.  Doing nothing (though the West has a long history of doing this) may no longer be an option but military intervention is not the answer.  The solution to Syria’s problems lies not in inflaming matters by intervention but in finding common ground with Russia, China and Iran that could form the basis for a peaceful solution.